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Abstract
The theory of branching space-times is designed as a rigorous frame-
work for modelling indeterminism in a relativistically sound way. In
that framework there is room for “funny business”, i.e., modal correla-
tions such as occur through quantum-mechanical entanglement. This
paper extends previous work by Belnap on notions of “funny business”.
We provide two generalized definitions of “funny business”. Combina-
torial funny business can be characterized as “absence of prima facie
consistent scenarios”, while explanatory funny business characterizes
situations in which no localized explanation of inconsistency can be
given. These two definitions of funny business are proved to be equiv-
alent, and we provide an example that shows them to be strictly more
general than the previously available definitions of “funny business”.
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1 Introduction
We should take indeterminism seriously as an objective feature of our world.
This means that there are events whose outcomes are not determined be-
fore they occur. Given relativity theory, such events must be localized in
bounded space-time regions or, to use an idealization, at space-time points.
The theory of branching space-times (Belnap 1992) was designed to provide
a formally rigorous framework for the analysis of questions pertaining to ob-
jective indeterminism. We will denote that theory, which will be employed in
this paper, as “BST-92” in order to distinguish it from other approaches to
“branching space-times” in the literature (cf. Belnap 2003 for an overview;
BST-92 is outlined in the Appendix).
If indeterminism is bound to localized events, it makes sense to ask in
which way such events may combine. We know from probability theory that
in combining probability spaces, correlations may show up. A probabilistic
correlation is signalled by the fact that the probability of a combined event is
not equal to the product of the probabilities of the subevents. We will not be
concerned with probabilities here, but with a question that is conceptually
prior: Given that some outcomes of localized events are individually possible,
we wish to understand which combinations of such outcomes are possible.
Thus, our topic may be called “modal correlations”.
If anything, modal correlations cry out for explanation even more than
probabilistic correlations. Consider two coins tossed independently at dif-
ferent locations. It would certainly be weird if the probabilities for the four
possible combined outcomes were not equal to the respective products of the
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individual probabilities—e.g., if both coins were fair (probability of “heads”
equal to 0.5), but the probabilities of “heads-heads” was, say, 0.1 instead
of the expected 0.25. Still, that probabilistic weirdness would be in accord
with ordinary expectations about the modal structure of the combined set-
up: given two independent set-ups with two possible outcomes each, there
would still be four possible combined outcomes. It would be much weirder
still if not just the probabilistic, but the underlying modal structure of
the combined set-up showed correlations—e.g., if the “head-head” outcome
was impossible, even though for each coin, the “head” outcome was possi-
ble. Yet, nature seems to exhibit exactly such modal correlations in certain
quantum-mechanical set-ups.1 What is going on in these cases? Certainly
this is “funny business”, and we will use this expression to signal intuitively
worrisome modal correlations.
The notion of modal correlations, or funny business, has been analyzed
by Belnap in two successive papers (Belnap 2002, Belnap 2003). The upshot
of these papers was that there seems to be a stable notion of funny business
in BST-92, which can be characterized in four equivalent ways, each of which
casts some additional light on notions of modal correlations, causation, and
screening-off. In this paper, we push the analysis one step further by tack-
ling infinite cases. We will give two new, equivalent definitions of funny
business in BST-92 that properly generalize the existing notions. These two
definitions will be given in the language of transitions, which concept has
been used in a BST-92 based analysis of causation (Belnap 2005). Even
though our paper becomes technical in places, the focus is on understanding
the conceptual structure of modal correlations.
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The structure of our paper is as follows: We first introduce our notation
and some key definitions of BST-92 as well as the four existing notions of
funny business (section 2). Then we provide three BST-92 models as test
cases (section 3). These models will be used to motivate our new definitions,
given in sections 4 and 5. Appendix A contains some formal details of BST-
92.
2 Notation and proposed definitions of funny busi-
ness
The label “BST-92” stands for the theory of branching space-times as laid
out in Belnap (1992). We define some of the key notions of that theory in
Appendix A. The interested reader is referred to Belnap (2002, 2003), where
additional motivation is given.
BST-92 describes alternative courses of events in terms of families of
histories branching at space-time points. These histories are carved from an
underlying partial ordering 〈W,≤〉. In the following, h stands for a history
(a maximally detailed possible course of events, corresponding, e.g., to a
single Minkowski space-time), I for an initial event (occurring in at least
one, but commonly in many histories), and O for an outcome event, starting
to occur in at least one history. An outcome event consists of one or more
outcome chains O ∈ O. The set of histories h for which h∩O 6= ∅ is denoted
H〈O〉. Different histories split off at one or more points, we write “h1 ⊥e h2”
for “history h1 splits off from history h2 at e.” Such splitting introduces a
partition Πe of the set H(e) of histories containing e. More generally, ΠI is
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the corresponding partition of the set H[I] of histories containing the initial
I, and ΠI〈h〉 is that member of that partition containing h. Two initials can
be space-like related, I1 slr I2, meaning that none of their members stand
in the relation of causal precedence. A basic transition is a pair 〈e, H〉,
written e  H, where H ∈ Πe. Basic transitions are the fundamental
indeterministic structures within branching space-times.
“Funny business” intuitively means that there is a spatio-temporal/modal
structure that has some special (funny) properties that strike one as odd,
weird, or counterintuitive. (Still, for all we know, such structures exist; wit-
ness the large literature on quantum-mechanical correlations and EPR-Bell-
type cases; cf. note 1 for some references.) Belnap (2002, 2003) proposed
four notions of “funny business” and showed them to be equivalent. We
refer the reader to these papers for details. The following definitions list the
four notions.
Definition 1 (Primary slr modal-correlation funny business)
Two initials I1 and I2 together with two outcome-determining histories h1
and h2 (Ii ⊆ hi for i = 1, 2) constitute a case of primary slr modal-
correlation funny business iff I1 slr I2, but ΠI1〈h1〉 ∩ΠI2〈h2〉 = ∅.
Thus, two intuitively independent (since slr ) initials and outcomes consti-
tute a case of funny business if the outcomes do not combine smoothly. This
definition will be generalized to what we call combinatorial funny business
below.
Definition 2 (Some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business)
An initial I, a scattered outcome event O and a history h constitute a case
of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business iff I is a cause-like locus
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for O w.r.t. h, but no member of I lies in the causal past of any member of
O.
According to this definition, funny business is linked to something like
“spooky action at a distance”: There is a cause-like initial I for O, but
that initial does not act in the causal past of O.
Definition 3 (No-prior-screener-off funny business)
A pair of scattered outcome events O1 and O2 constitute a case of no-prior-
screener-off funny business iff
1. Each of O1 and O2 is individually consistent, i.e., H〈O1〉 6= ∅ and
H〈O2〉 6= ∅,
2. H〈O1〉 is inconsistent with H〈O2〉, i.e., H〈O1〉 ∩H〈O2〉 = ∅, but
3. ¬∃e ∃O1 ∈ O1 ∃O2 ∈ O2 [e < O1 and e < O2 and ∀h ∈ H(e) [(Πe〈h〉 ∩
H〈O1〉 = ∅) or (Πe〈h〉 ∩H〈O1〉 = ∅)].
In such a case, two outcomes are individually consistent yet inconsistent,
and we are lacking an intuitively satisfactory explanation of the inconsis-
tency, which would have to be in terms of a prior event e separating off the
two inconsistent outcomes. This notion will be generalized to what we call
explanatory funny business below.
Definition 4 (No-prior-common-cause-like-locus funny business)
A pair of scattered outcome events O1 and O2 together with a pair of
histories h1 and h2 constitute a case of no-prior-common-cause-like-locus
funny business iff
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1. Each of O1 and O2 is individually consistent, as witnessed by h1 and
h2 (i.e., h1 ∈ H〈O1〉 and h2 ∈ H〈O2〉),
2. H〈O1〉 is inconsistent with H〈O2〉, i.e., H〈O1〉 ∩H〈O2〉 = ∅, but
3. ¬∃e ∃O1 ∈ O1 ∃O2 ∈ O2 [e < O1 and e < O2 and h1 ⊥e h2].
This definition gives a variant of the idea behind the previous definition.
The main result of Belnap (2003) is to establish the equivalence of these
four notions. Thus, we have the following Theorem:
Theorem 1
In a BST-92 model 〈W,≤〉, there is a case of primary slr modal-correlation
funny business iff there is a case of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny
business iff there is a case of no-prior-screener-off funny business iff there is
a case of no-prior-common-cause-like-locus funny business.
In this paper, we propose to extend the previous analysis of “funny busi-
ness” in such a way as to cover certain infinite structures that are intuitively
“funny”, but which are not covered by the existing definitions. Also, in line
with the project of explaining causation in terms of basic transitions, initi-
ated by Belnap (2005), the new definition will apply to sets of transitions,
which may be easier to handle than the spatio-temporal/modal structures
involved in the previous definitions.
3 Test cases
In this section we will construct three BST-92 structures. One is clearly in-
nocent as regards funny business, while the other two are intuitively “funny”,
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since they both exhibit space-like correlations.2 For all structures, we will
proceed in two steps: We will first define the structures and prove that they
fulfill the postulates of BST-92. In a second step, we will give an intuitive
assessment of whether the structures exhibit “funny business”, and check
whether the existing definitions of funny business apply in the appropriate
way. For the last structure, M2, this will not be so, and this fact will then
motivate our extended definitions of funny business to be presented below.
(1,1)
FLC
PLC
Figure 1: M, the two-dimensional Minkowski plane. The figure shows the
past light cone (PLC) and future light cone (FLC) for the point (1,1). For
all (x, y) ∈ PLC, we have (x, y) <M (1, 1), while for all (x, y) ∈ FLC,
(1, 1) <M (x, y).
Our first two structures will be derived from a 2-dimensional Minkowski
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space-time M (cf. Figure 1). This is the structure
M = 〈M, <M 〉,
where the base set M = R2 is the set of pairs of real numbers (the Euclidean
plane), and the (causal) partial ordering <M is defined within light cones
(taking the speed of light c = 1), as follows:
(x, y) <M (x
′, y′) iff |x− x′| < |y − y′| and y < y′.
Furthermore, our structures will exhibit indeterminism in the form of a 2-
way splitting, with the outcomes denoted as “0” and “1”. You may think of
these indeterministic events as coin tosses, or as measurements of the spin
projection of a spin-1/2 particle along some axis, or of some other simple
indeterministic event. We will not look at probabilistic setups (which would
require an extension of the basic structure of BST-92; cf. Weiner and Belnap
(2006) and Mu¨ller (2005)), so by “correlations” we mean modal correlations,
or perfect correlations.
As a warm-up, and in order to introduce some techniques that we will use
in the “funny” models, we first present a straightforward BST-92 structure
without funny business, which you may think of as modelling two coins
tossed independently at different locations.
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3.1 M0: no funny business
We start with the set
C =df {(−1, 0), (1, 0)},
which will be our two choice points (the space-time locations at which the
coin tosses happen; at these points, the outcomes are not yet fixed). We
will use p, p′, etc., to range over M , and we employ the notation
J−(p) =df {p
′ ∈ M | p′ <M p}
to denote the causal past (the past light cone) of p (excluding the point p
itself).
Our BST-92 structure M0 is based on the set W , defined as
W =df {〈p, G〉 | p ∈ M, G ⊆ C ∩ J
−(p)}.
On W we define a partial ordering < via
〈p1, G1〉 < 〈p2, G2〉 iff p1 <M p2 and G1 = G2 ∩ J
−(p1).
The interpretation of the set and its ordering is as follows: A point e =
〈p, G〉 ∈ W stands for the space-time location p ∈ M , considered in a
history in which exactly the initials from G, which lie in the past of p, show
outcome “0”, while all other initials that are in the past of p show outcome
“1”. (Thus, the elements of W contain no information about the outcomes
of choice points that are space-like related to, or in the causal future of, p.)
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The ordering then says that two elements of W stand in the ordering relation
exactly if their spatio-temporal locations are ordered appropriately and the
information on “0” and “1” outcomes from the lower point is consistent with
that from the higher point. (If you wish, you may read this as some kind of
“no backward branching” requirement.)
We now show that M0 = 〈W, <〉 fulfills the postulates of BST-92.
Lemma 1 (Histories in M0)
The histories in M0 are exactly the sets
hi = {〈p, G〉 | p ∈ M, G = Ci ∩ J
−(p)}, i = 1, . . . , 4,
where the Ci are the four subsets of C: ∅, {(−1, 0)}, {(1, 0)}, and C itself.
Proof: “⇐”: Let hi be one of the mentioned sets. We need to show that
that set is a history in M0, i.e., that it is a maximally directed set. For
directedness, take e1 = 〈p1, Ci ∩ J
−(p1)〉, e2 = 〈p2, Ci ∩ J
−(p2)〉 ∈ W . As p1
and p2 have an upper bound, p, in M , the point 〈p, Ci ∩ J
−(p)〉 ∈ W is an
upper bound for e1 and e2 in W . For maximality, assume that e = 〈p, G〉 6∈
hi and note that e
′ = 〈p, Ci ∩ J
−(p)〉 ∈ h. If hi ∪ {e} were a subset of some
directed set h∗, then h∗ would have to contain an upper bound e∗ = 〈p∗, G∗〉
above both e and e′. But then by the definition of the ordering, we would
have to have G = G∗ ∩ J−(p) = Ci ∩ J
−(p), contradicting e 6∈ hi.
“⇒”: Let h be a maximally directed subset of W . We need to show that
h = hi for one of the hi defined above.
Assume for reductio that h does not contain a point e1 = 〈p1, G1〉 such
that (−1, 0) <M p1. Let e = 〈p, G〉 ∈ h. Since (−1, 0) /∈ J
−(p) by assump-
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tion, and so is not in G ⊆ C ∩ J−(p), either G = ∅ or G = {(1, 0)}. Hence
either G = C1∩J
−(p) or G = C3∩J
−(p), so that e ∈ (h1∪h3), and accord-
ingly h ⊆ (h1 ∪ h3). Therefore either h = h1 or h = h3 (as proven in Belnap
(1992)); but then the definition of the hi contradicts the assumption, so that
h must after all contain a point e1 = 〈p1, G1〉 such that (−1, 0) <M p1. An
exactly similar argument establishes that h contains a point e2 = 〈p2, G2〉
such that (1, 0) <M p2.
Given that h contains both such an e1 and such an e2, since h is directed,
it must contain an upper bound e = 〈p, G〉 for e1 and e2, so (−1, 0) <M p,
(1, 0) <M p. By the definition of W , we have G ⊆ C, so G = Ci for one
of i = 1, . . . , 4. We can now show that h ⊆ hi. Otherwise, let e
′ ∈ h − hi,
i.e, e′ = 〈p′, G′〉 with G′ 6= Ci ∩ J
−(p′). By directedness of h, there must
be e∗ = 〈p∗, G∗〉 ∈ h above both e and e′. Now from e < e∗ we have
G = Ci = G
∗ ∩ J−(p) = G∗, but then by e′ < e∗ we also have G′ =
G∗ ∩ J−(p′) = Ci ∩ J
−(p′), showing that e′ ∈ hi, contrary to assumption.
Finally, in virtue of the maximality of h, h ⊆ hi implies that h = hi. 
In order to establish the other postulates of BST-92, note that density
and the existence of suprema and infima carry over from M. It remains to
establish the prior choice postulate.
Lemma 2 (M0 satisfies the prior choice postulate)
M0 satisfies the prior choice postulate, i.e., if O is a lower bounded chain in
hi − hj , there is a point e ∈ hi ∩ hj such that e is a lower bound for O and
e is maximal in hi ∩ hj .
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Proof: Let O ⊂ hi − hj be a lower bounded chain. Set
∆ij = (Ci − Cj) ∪ (Cj − Ci),
the set of indeterministic initials whose outcomes distinguish hi from hj .
(1) If pk ∈ ∆ij , then 〈pk, ∅〉 is maximal in hi ∩ hj : Take pk ∈ ∆ij .
By Lemma 1, 〈pk, ∅〉 ∈ hi ∩ hj . For maximality, let e = 〈p, G〉 ∈ hi s.t.
〈pk, ∅〉 < e. Then G = Ci ∩ J
−(p) (as e ∈ hi), but as pk <M p and pk ∈ ∆ij ,
it must be that G 6= Cj ∩ J
−(p), so that e 6∈ hj .
(2) For e = 〈p, G〉 ∈ O, from e ∈ hi − hj we get G = Ci ∩ J
−(p) 6=
Cj ∩ J
−(p), so there is a pk ∈ ∆ij s.t. pk <M p. It remains to prove
that there is pk ∈ ∆ij s.t. for all e = 〈p, G〉 ∈ O we have pk <M p, since
then 〈pk, ∅〉 < O, and maximality was established above. So assume for
reductio that there is no such pk, i.e., for all pk ∈ ∆ij there is ek ∈ O s.t.
〈pk, ∅〉 6< ek. Let E contain such a witness ek for each pk ∈ ∆ij : we set
E =df {ek | pk ∈ ∆ij}. Now E ⊆ O, so E is a chain in hi − hj , and as
∆ij is finite, E contains a least element, e0 = 〈p0, G0〉. Now we cannot have
pk < p0 for any pk ∈ ∆ij , for else by transitivity (noting that E is a chain)
we would have 〈pk, ∅〉 < e0 ≤ ek, contrary to the construction of E. That
is, ∆ij ∩ J
−(p0) = ∅. But then G0 = Ci ∩ J
−(p0) = Cj ∩ J
−(p0), so that
e0 ∈ hj , contradicting e0 ∈ O. 
The structure M0 does not exhibit any strange correlations—to each
combination of outcomes of the indeterministic events in M0 there corre-
sponds a history. As we would expect, M0 is not a case of funny business in
the technical sense either.
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Fact 1
The structure M0 does not exhibit primary space-like related modal-correlation
funny business.
Proof: The only candidate for primary space-like related modal-correlation
funny business are the initials I1 = {〈(−1, 0), ∅〉} and I2 = {〈(1, 0), ∅〉}.
However, any combination of outcomes is consistent, as witnessed by the
four histories h1, . . . , h4. 
3.2 M1: EPR-like funny business
For the model M1 we start with the set C as above. However, there will be a
new intermediate step: We select a proper subset C of the powerset of C to
mark the possible combinations of outcomes, rather than selecting the full
powerset as above. Thus, we set C = {∅, {(−1, 0)}, {(1, 0)}}. The definition
of W is almost as above:
W =df {〈p, Gi〉 | p ∈ M, Gi = Ci ∩ J
−(p), Ci ∈ C, i = 1, . . . , 3}.
The partial ordering is defined exactly as above. In order to show that
M1 = 〈W, <〉 fulfills the postulates of BST-92, we follow the proof for M0
almost to the letter. The history lemma reads:
Lemma 3 (Histories in M1)
The histories in M1 are exactly the sets
hi = {〈p, Gi〉 | p ∈ M, Gi = Ci ∩ J
−(p)}, i = 1, . . . , 3,
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where the Ci are the elements of C.
The proof of the Lemma is as above, and the prior choice principle is
also established exactly as already shown. (It helps to note that M1 is a
substructure of M0, with exactly the points 〈p, {(−1, 0), (1, 0)}〉missing from
W .)
The structure M1 is weird: While the two choice points are space-like
related, and each could have outcome “0” (as witnessed by h2 and h3),
there is no history in which they both have the outcome “0”. This is exactly
the type of set-up for which the term “funny business” was coined, and
accordingly, the definition applies:
Fact 2
The structure M1 exhibits primary slr modal-correlation funny business.
Proof: Consider the initials I1 = {〈(−1, 0), ∅〉} and I2 = {〈(1, 0), ∅〉}. They
are space-like related, and histories h2 and h3 witness that each can have
outcome “0”. However, there is no history in M1 that witnesses the com-
bined outcome. 
3.3 M2: Infinite funny business
In order to show that there can be funny business that is not a case of the
existing definitions, we use the following combinatorics: Let there be de-
numerably many slr choice points (labelled by n ∈ N), each with binary
splitting (outcomes 0 and 1). We will construct a model in which the his-
tories correspond to exactly those combinations of outcomes in which only
finitely many 0’s occur. This will result in intuitively “funny combinatorics”,
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as each choice point can have outcome 0, but the combination “all outcomes
are 0” cannot occur. However, there will be no case of primary slr modal-
correlation funny business (Def. 1). To see this, let I1 and I2 be subsets of
N s.t. I1 ∩ I2 = ∅; this exhausts all possible choices of slr initials. Now let
histories h1 and h2 witness some outcome of I1 and of I2, respectively. As
histories correspond to exactly those combinations of outcomes with finitely
many 0’s, the designated combined outcome for the initial I1 ∪ I2 involves
only finitely many 0’s as well, and thus there is a history h∗ witnessing the
combined outcome. Thus there is no case of primary slr modal-correlation
funny business — but there is obviously funny business going on!
An attempt to construct a model with these combinatorics along the lines
of the construction of M1 results in an instructive failure. Using Minkowski
space-time as the background, we specify the points (0, n), n ∈ N, as desig-
nated choice points:
C = {(n, 0) | n ∈ N}.
The set of allowed combinations, C, is the set of finite subsets of C:
C = {Ci ⊂ C | Ci is finite}.
The construction of W and of the ordering then follows the lines of the
construction of M1 exactly. As in the proof of Lemma 1, one sees that for
each Ci ∈ C, the set
hi = {〈p, G〉 | p ∈ M, G = Ci ∩ J
−(p)}
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is indeed a history. However, there are histories that are not of this form.
To see this, consider the “vertical” chain 〈pn, Gn〉 of points with pn = (0, n)
and Gn = C ∩ J
−(pn), n ∈ N. Each Gn is finite, so the points 〈pn, Gn〉 do
belong to the envisaged structure, and by the construction of the ordering,
〈pn, Gn〉 ≤ 〈pn+1, Gn+1〉.
Thus, we have a chain (thus, also a directed set), and by Zorn’s Lemma,
there is a history h∗ (a maximal directed set) containing the chain. Now
in h∗, all choice points have the 0 outcome, thus thwarting the attempt to
implement the “funny” combinatorics in analogy with M1.
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The following construction, which is much sparser, does provide a means
for implementing the sought-for combinatorics. Roughly, one takes denu-
merably many copies of the real line, binds them together at some point
“far back”, and only combines those lines by the ordering that reflect the
sought-for combinatorics. You may think of the position along the real line
as an analogue of temporal location, while the other aspects of the construc-
tion give rise to space-like separation. Thus, let F be the set of all functions
f : N → {0, 1} such that for only finitely many n ∈ N, f(n) = 0.
Now set W = W0 ∪W1 ∪W2 ∪W3 to be the union of the following four
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Cartesian products:
W0 = (−∞, 0],
W1 = (0, 1]× N,
W2 = (1, 2)× N× {0, 1},
W3 = [2,∞)× F.
For each tuple e ∈ Wi, its first coordinate pictures “temporal location” along
the real line, while the other coordinates picture the “space-like position”
in the bundle W . Our ordering, <, is the transitive closure of the following
relations (a) within the Wi and (b) between elements of Wi and Wi+1:
(a) For e, e′ from the same Wi: e < e
′ iff the first coordinate of e is
smaller than that of e′ and the other coordinates are the same. E.g., for
x, y ∈ W0, let x < y in W iff x < y as reals; and for (x, n), (y, m) ∈ W1,
let (x, n) < (y, m) iff x < y and n = m.
(b.0) x < (y, n) for every x ∈ W0 and (y, n) ∈ W1.
(b.1) For (x, n) ∈ W1 and (y, m, i) ∈ W2: (x, n) < (y, m, i) iff n = m.
(b.2) For (x, n, i) ∈ W2 and (y, f) ∈ W3: (x, n, i) < (y, f) iff f(n) = i.
It is clear that (x, a) < (y, b) only if x < y, and hence < is a (strict) partial
ordering. Figure 2 illustrates this ordering and indicates where the boundary
points belong.
In order to prove that this structure fulfills the postulates of BST-92,
we first note that the histories are in one-to-one correspondence with the
members of F.
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0
Figure 2: The ordering relations in the model M2.
Lemma 4
The histories in M2 are exactly the sets
hf =df W0 ∪ W1 ∪ {(x, n, i) ∈ W2 | f(n) = i} ∪ {(x, g) ∈ W3 | g = f}
with f ∈ F.
Proof: “⇐”: For f ∈ F, hf is maximally directed. Directedness is es-
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tablished easily (use some (y, f) with y large enough). Maximality also
follows straightforwardly from the definition of the ordering, noting that as
W0 ∪W1 ⊂ hf , an element e ∈ W − hf must be of the form (x, n, i
′) with
f(n) 6= i′, or (x, f ′) with f 6= f ′.
“⇒”: In the other direction, let D be a nonempty directed subset of W .
We will show that there is f ∈ F for which D ⊆ hf . By maximality of the
hf , we will thereby have established our claim. We distinguish three cases:
(i) If D ⊂ W0 ∪W1, we have D ⊂ hf for any f ∈ F, as remarked above.
(ii) Assume that D ⊂ W0 ∪ W1 ∪ W2. Let e = (x, n, i) ∈ D ∩ W2.
Now any e′ = (x′, n′, i′) ∈ D ∩W2 must fulfill n = n
′ and i = i′, as upper
bounds for other elements of W2 lie in W3, and by assumption, D∩W3 = ∅.
Accordingly, D ⊂ hf for any f ∈ F for which f(n) = i.
(iii) Finally, assume that D ∩ W3 6= ∅, so D contains an element e =
(x, f) ∈ W3. As (x, f) and (y, g) with f 6= g do not have an upper bound
in W , we have D ∩W3 ⊂ hf . To establish D ∩W2 ⊂ hf , let e
′ = (y, n, i) ∈
D∩W2. Any upper bound for e and e
′ must be of the form (x′, f), and thus
by the definition of the ordering, e′ < e, which means f(n) = i, implying
f ∈ hf . Thus D ⊆ hf . 
Next we note that M2 has the right topology:
Lemma 5
M2 fulfills the topological requirements of BST-92, i.e.,
1. Every lower bounded chain c ⊆ W has an infimum (greatest lower
bound), inf c.
2. If c ⊆ W is an upper bounded chain and c ⊆ h for a history h, then
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there exists a (history-relative) supremum (least upper bound) of c in
h, suph c ∈ h.
3. W has no minimal or maximal elements.
Proof: (3) is straightforward in virtue of the ordering. For (1) and (2),
one only needs to consider the cases in which the supremum or infimum
corresponds to x = 0, 1, or 2. In each of these cases, the definition of W
secures the right topology. E.g., points (2, f) act both as infima of chains
such as (2 + 1/n, f)n∈N, and as suprema of chains such as (2− 1/n, n, i)n∈N
in histories hf for which f(n) = i. 
It remains to prove the prior choice principle.
Lemma 6
M2 satisfies the prior choice principle: Let f, f
′ ∈ F, let I be some index
set, and let (ci)i∈I be a lower bounded chain in hf − hf ′ . Then there is a
lower bound e for (ci)i∈I that is maximal in hf ∩ hf ′ .
Proof: We first show that any point en = (1, n) with f(n) 6= f
′(n) is
maximal in hf ∩ hf ′ . As the en are elements of any history, they clearly
belong to the intersection. For maximality, let e ∈ hf with (1, n) < e. Then
either e = (x, n, i) with f(n) = i 6= f ′(n), whence e 6∈ hf ′ , or e = (x, f),
which again is not an element of hf ′ .
Concerning the chain (ci)i∈I , we consider two cases. (1) If (2, f) is a
lower bound for the chain, then any (1, n) with n s.t. f(n) 6= f ′(n) will
serve as a witness of the prior choice principle. (2) If there are ci for which
ci < (2, f), then by the fact that all these elements belong to hf−hf ′ and by
linearity, they must all be of the form (x, n, i) for fixed n and i—elements of
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the form (x) or (x, n) belong to hf ∩hf ′ , and elements (x, n, i) and (x
′, n′, i′)
for n 6= n′ or i 6= i′ are incomparable. Thus, (1, n) is a lower bound for the
chain (ci)i∈I . 
M2 is certainly a funny model: It witnesses the strange combinatorics
outlined at the beginning of this section; all of the denumerably many points
(1, n), n ∈ N, are binary splitting points, and yet there is no history in which
infinitely many “0” outcomes occur. As intended, the funnyness of M2 is
not covered by the existing notions of funny business:
Fact 3
M2 does not contain a case of primary slr modal-correlation funny business
(nor, in view of Theorem 1, any of the three other cases of definitions 2, 3,
or 4).
The proof has already been given above, in motivating the combinatorics
used in M2. 
4 Combinatorial funny business
The key idea behind primary slr modal-correlation funny business (Def. 1)
is that there are two well-behaved set-ups (initials Ii and outcomes Πi,
i = 1, 2) that one would expect to combine smoothly (since I1 slr I2), but
the histories that would witness smooth combination are missing (Π1〈h1〉 ∩
Π2〈h2〉 = ∅). This is an intrinsically binary concept that, as shown, does
not cover some troublesome infinite structures. However, one can general-
ize by spelling out “well-behaved set-up” in terms of primary transitions
(irreducible indeterministic transitions ti = ei  Hi), as follows:
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Definition 5 (Combinatorial consistency)
A set T of basic transitions is combinatorially consistent iff for any ti, tj ∈ T :
1. if ei = ej , then Hi = Hj (i.e., ti = tj);
2. if ei < ej , then H(ej) ⊆ Hi (i.e., ti < tj);
3. if ej < ei, then H(ei) ⊆ Hj (i.e., tj < ti);
4. if ei and ej are incomparable, then ei slr ej .
As one would expect, sets of transitions that are in fact consistent are
also well-behaved according to the definition:
Lemma 7
If T is consistent, then it is also combinatorially consistent.
Proof: Assume T is combinatorially inconsistent. Thus, there are ti, tj ∈ T
violating one of the four clauses from the definition. In each of these cases,
clearly Hi ∩Hj = ∅. 
The other direction does not hold in general, but if it fails, something at
least mildly counterintuitive is going on: The set T is well-behaved, but the
combinatorics do not work out as expected. Thus we define:
Definition 6 (Combinatorial funny business)
T constitutes a case of combinatorial funny business iff T is combinatorially
consistent, but HT = ∅.
Fact 4
Both M1 and M2 are cases of combinatorial funny business.
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Proof: The initials of indeterministic transitions in both these structures
are pairwise space-like related, so the corresponding sets of transitions with
outcomes “all 0” fulfill clause (4) of Definition 5—but as noted, there is no
history in these structures witnessing these outcomes. 
As we showed at the end of the previous section, the notion of primary
slr modal-correlation funny business does not cover M2 (nor, by the light
of Theorem 1, does any of the other existing notions). However, the previous
notions smoothly embed into the new one:
Lemma 8
The new notion of combinatorial funny business (CFB) relates to the old
notion of primary slr modal-correlation funny business (PSLRMCFB) in
the following ways:
1. CFB is an extension of the notion of PSLRMCFB: Every case of
PSLRMCFB is a case of CFB.
2. CFB is a proper extension of PSLRMCFB: There are cases of CFB
that are not cases of PSLRMCFB.
3. For finite T , CFB is equivalent to PSLRMCFB.4
Proof sketch: (1) Given a case of PMCFB (Ii, hi, i = 1, 2), the two initials
I1 and I2 consist of pairwise SLR initials and are themselves consistent, so
T = {e  Πe〈h1〉 | e ∈ I1} ∪ {e  Πe〈h2〉 | e ∈ I2}
is combinatorially consistent, but T is inconsistent by assumption. Thus, T
is a case of CFB. (2) follows from Facts 3 and 4. For (3), cf. Lemma 2 of
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Mu¨ller (2005). 
5 Explanatory funny business
Through the new notion of “combinatorial funny business” we have reached
our aim of providing for an extended notion of “funny business” that would
apply to troublesome infinite cases. Specifically, Lemma 8 shows that the
new definition extends the previous “modal correlation” reading of “funny
business”, PSLRMCFB. By Theorem 1, the new definition also extends the
other three existing notions, some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny busi-
ness (SCLLNIPFB), no-prior-screener-off funny business (NPSOFB), and
no-prior-common-cause-like-locus funny business (NPCCLLFB). It would
still be nice to see in a more direct way how the new definition extends these
three notions, since their motivation is somewhat different from PSLRM-
CFB. In the latter case, the guiding idea was “wrong kind of combinatorics”
(there is a case of inconsistency where one would not expect it). In the
former three cases, the guiding idea may be seen to be “warped explana-
tory account”: Each of the three definitions states that there is a case of
inconsistency that one cannot make intelligible. SCLLNIPFB states that
an explanation (a cause-like locus) is available, but that it does not bear
the right kind of spatio-temporal relation to the outcome O. NPSOFB and
NPCCLLFB both state that an explanatory account of the right sort cannot
be found at all.
By moving from general spatio-temporal/modal structures to sets of ba-
sic transitions, we can give a simpler analysis of this kind of “failure of an
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attempted explanatory account”. The guiding idea is the following: If a
set of transitions T is inconsistent (the transitions have no joint outcome),
then we can make this inconsistency intelligible by showing that T in some
way conflates causal alternatives. Alternatives cannot occur together, so if
one is presented with a set T in which alternatives are mixed, one readily
understands why T should be inconsistent. This may all be well, but what
does “causal alternatives” mean? For sets of transitions, there is at least
one clear answer, captured by the following definition:
Definition 7 (Blatant inconsistency)
A set T = {ei  Hi | i ∈ I} of transitions is blatantly inconsistent iff there
are ti, tj ∈ T s.t. ei = ej , but Hi 6= Hj .
Thus, blatant inconsistency means that in T , two local causal alterna-
tives, ti and tj , both with the same initial but with different outcomes, are
thrown together.
If a given inconsistent set T is blatantly inconsistent, then an account
of why it is inconsistent is already available. More generally, one may hope
that for inconsistent T , one could make the inconsistency intelligible by
showing how T could be viewed in such a way as to reveal some blatant
inconsistency. In order to get rid of this metaphor, we propose the following
notion of “explanation seeking” downward extension:
Definition 8 (Downward extension)
The set T ∗ is a downward extension of T iff (1) T ⊆ T ∗ and (2) for any
(new) t∗ ∈ (T ∗ − T ), there are (already) ti, tj ∈ T s.t. (a) e
∗ ≤ ei, e
∗ < ej
and (b) t∗ 6≤ ti, t
∗ < tj .
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That is, in downward extending one may add new transitions t∗ = e∗ 
H∗ that serve to split off old inconsistencies from one another: the new t∗
rules out ti, but it is compatible with tj . These new transitions may help to
make the inconsistency of a set T more intelligible by giving more detail.
The definition of “downward extension” is deliberately not meant to
single out one (“exhaustive”) extension; a given T may have many downward
extensions that may be more or less helpful in making T more intelligible.
In some cases, however, the extension is unique:
Lemma 9
If T is combinatorially consistent, then T itself is its only downward exten-
sion.
Proof: Let T be combinatorially consistent, and let ti, tj ∈ T . Let e
∗ fulfill
the required clause (2.a) for “downward extension”, i.e., e∗ ≤ ei, e
∗ < ej .
We show that in none of the four cases allowed by Definition 5 can we select
H∗ ∈ Πe∗ such as to fulfill the second clause (2.b) for “downward extension”.
(i) ti = tj : (2.b) is contradictory. (ii) ti < tj : if e
∗ < ei, then (2.b) fails since
t∗ < tj requires H
∗ = Πe∗〈ej〉, and by transitivity we get H
∗ = Πe∗〈ei〉. If,
on the other hand, e∗ = ei, then t
∗ < tj requires t
∗ = ti. (iii) is symmetrical
to case (ii). (iv) ei slr ej : with e
∗ < ei, e
∗ < ej , there is a history through e
∗
(witnessing the slr aspect) containing both ei and ej , which thus cannot
be split at e∗. 
If a given set T is inconsistent, one can hope that it will be possible to
arrive at a downward extension of T that is blatantly inconsistent. This
would make the inconsistency plainly intelligible. If that hope is frustrated,
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something funny is going on. Thus we define:
Definition 9 (Explanatory funny business)
A set T of transitions is a case of explanatory funny business iff (1) T is
inconsistent and (2) there is no downward extension of T that is blatantly
inconsistent.
It turns out that the notion of explanatory funny business is equivalent
to the previous notion of combinatorial funny business; thus it also applies
to troublesome infinite cases.
Theorem 2
In a model of branching space-times, there is a case of explanatory funny
business (EFB) iff there is a case of combinatorial funny business (CFB).
Proof: “⇒”: Assume that there is no CFB, and let T be inconsistent. Since
there is no CFB, T must be combinatorially inconsistent, i.e., there must be
ti, tj ∈ T violating one of the clauses (1)–(4) of Definition 5. In each case
we can construct a downward extension of T that is blatently inconsistent.
1. ei = ej , Hi 6= Hj : T is already blatantly inconsistent.
2. ei < ej , H(ej) 6⊆ Hi: One may add the transition ei  Πei〈ej〉, creating
blatant inconsistency.
3. ej < ei, H(ei) 6⊆ Hj : as in the previous case
4. ei and ej are incompatible (i.e., do not belong to any one history). By
the prior choice principle one can find a prior splitting point e∗ for
ei and ej and add t
∗
1 = e
∗
 Πe∗〈ei〉, t
∗
2 = e
∗
 Πe∗〈ej〉, creating
blatant inconsistency.
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Thus, T is not a case of EFB.
“⇐”: Let T be a case of CFB, i.e., combinatorially consistent, but in-
consistent. By clause (1) of Definition 5, T is not blatantly inconsistent, and
by Lemma 9, T is its own unique downward extension. Thus T is a case of
EFB. 
From Theorems 1 and 2 it is already clear that the notion of EFB is
a proper extension of the three previous “explanatory” notions of funny
business, SCLLNIPFB, NPSOFB, and NPCCLLFB. Luckily, there is a more
perspicuous interdependence: An alternative, direct proof that EFB extends
these three notions is readily available. We show the link between EFB and
NPCCLLFB explicitly:
Lemma 10
The new notion of explanatory funny business (EFB) relates to the old
notion of no prior common cause-like locus funny business (NCCLLFB) in
the following ways:
1. EFB is an extension of the notion of NCCLLFB: Every case of NC-
CLLFB is a case of EFB.
2. EFB is a proper extension of NCCLLFB: There are cases of EFB that
are not cases of NCCLLFB.
Proof sketch: (1) Given a case of NCCLLFB (Oi, hi, i = 1, 2), set
Ti := {e  Πe〈O〉 | O ∈ Oi, e = inf(O)}, i = 1, 2; T := T1 ∪ T2.
The Ti are consistent, whereas T is inconsistent. If there was a proper exten-
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sion T ∗ of T that was blatantly inconsistent, there would have to be (new) t∗
and t1, t2 ∈ T1∪T2 fulfilling the clause for “downward extension” above. As
the Ti are consistent and thus, combinatorially consistent, Lemma 9 shows
that we must have t1 ∈ T1, t2 ∈ T2 (modulo relabelling). But then e
∗ would
serve to split off T1 from T2, acting as a common cause, thus violating clause
(3) of the definition of NCCLLFB (Def. 4), which requires:
¬∃e ∃O1 ∈ O1 ∃O2 ∈ O2 (e < O1 ∧ e < O2 ∧ h1 ⊥e h2)
for histories hi ∈ H〈Oi〉, i = 1, 2.
(2) follows from Facts 3 and 4 via Theorem 2. 
6 Conclusion
The concept of “modal correlation” seems innocent at first—after all, “modal
correlation” just means that some local possibilities do not combine to be-
come global possibilities.
However, formal analysis of the concept of modal correlation reveals
some surprising complexities. Getting clear about modal correlations means
getting clear about the concept of local and global possibilities first. That
in turn presupposes a formal theory of possibility in space and time. Such a
theory is provided by BST-92, and preceeding analyses of modal correlations
(Belnap 2002, 2003) have accordingly employed that framework.
The present paper has shown that despite the stability of the preceed-
ing analyses, witnessed by the equivalence result of Theorem 1, there are
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further cases of “funny business” that call for an extension of the previ-
ous definitions. We have provided two equivalent, new definitions of “funny
business” that spell out what we claim are two main intuitions behind the
concept of modal correlations, or “funny business”. (1) Local possibilities
do not give rise to expected global possibilities. That intuition had found
expression in the notion of “primary space-like-related modal-correlation
funny business”. That notion was based on combining two local possibili-
ties. Our notion of “combinatorial funny business” extends that notion in
such a way that infinite sets of local possibilities can be handled smoothly.
The extension is natural in that the previous notion appears as a special
case (Lemma 8). (2) Global impossibilities do not have the right kind of
local explanation. That concept can be made out as a guiding intuition
behind the three other proposed definitions of “some cause-like-locus-not-
in-past funny business”, “no-prior-screener-off funny business”, and “no-
prior-common-cause-like-locus funny business”. Our notion of “explanatory
funny business” provides the extension of these concepts that is needed to
account for infinite cases. The link is most obvious with respect to “no-
prior-common-cause-like-locus funny business”, as witnessed by Lemma 10.
It is our hope that the generality achieved through the present defini-
tions gives, relative to the austere framework of branching space-times, the
definite analysis of the notion of “modal correlation”.
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A Appendix: Some details of branching space-
times
BST-92 starts with two primitive notions: “Our world”, W , whose members
are defined as point events, and ≤, the “causal order” on W . It is assumed
that ≤ is a dense partial order on W with no maximal elements. A history h
is a maximal directed set, where a set is directed if it contains an upper bound
for each pair of its members. A set of histories, also called a proposition, is
usually denoted by H.
O is an outcome chain (nonempty and lower bounded chain, where a set
is a chain if each two of its members are comparable by ≤); provably O ⊆ h
for some h. It is assumed that O has always a unique infimum inf O, and it
is provable that given e ∈ h, there is an O such that O ∩ h 6= ∅ and e < O
and e = inf O. It is also assumed that every upper bounded chain has a
supremum in every history to which it belongs. An initial event I is a set of
point events all of which are members of some one history, and a scattered
outcome event O is a set of outcome chains all of which overlap some one
history. By the prior choice postulate, for every O ⊆ h1−h2 there is a point
e ≤ O that is maximal in the intersection h1 ∩ h2.
H(e) = {h | e ∈ h} is the proposition saying that e occurs. More gen-
erally, H[I] = {h | I ⊆ h} is the proposition saying that I occurs. H〈O〉 =
{h | h ∩ O 6= ∅} is the proposition saying that O occurs, and for a scat-
tered outcome event O, the occurrence proposition is H〈O〉 = ∩O∈OH〈O〉. A
proposition H is consistent iff H 6= ∅, and an event of some type (e, O,O, I)
is consistent iff its occurrence proposition is.
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Two histories are undivided at e, h1 ≡e h2, iff e belongs to their intersec-
tion, but is not maximal therein. More generally, h1 ≡I h2 iff h1 ≡e h2 for
every e ∈ I. By the prior choice postulate, undividedness-at-e (and thus,
undividedness-at-I) is an equivalence relation, and the corresponding parti-
tion of H(e) (of H[I]) is denoted Πe (ΠI). Given e ∈ h, Πe〈h〉 is that member
of Πe to which h belongs; similarly for ΠI〈h〉.
Point events are space-like-related iff they are distinct, not causally or-
dered and share a history. I1 slr I2 means that every point event in I1 is
space-like related to every point event in I2.
h1 is separated from h2 at e, written h1 ⊥e h2, iff e is maximal in h1∩h2.
More generally, h1 is separated from H at I, written h1 ⊥I H, iff for every
h2 ∈ H there is some e ∈ I for which h1 ⊥e h2. Similarly for H1 ⊥I H2.
h1 is relevantly separated from H at I, written h1⊥IH, iff h1 is separated
from H at I, and each e ∈ I plays a role, i.e., for every e ∈ I there is some
h2 ∈ H s.t. h1 ⊥e h2. I is a cause-like locus for O w.r.t. h iff h⊥IH〈O〉.
A transition is a pair 〈I, O〉 of an initial and an outcome, written I  O.
Basic transitions ti = ei  Hi are from a point ei to one of the elements
Hi ∈ Πe of the partition of H(ei). T = {ti | i ∈ I} is a set of basic transitions,
I some index set. We use
HT := ∩ti∈T Hi
to stand for the common outcome of T . T is consistent iff HT 6= ∅. On the
set of basic transitions, a partial ordering is defined via
ti < tj iff ei < ej and H(ej) ∩Hi 6= ∅.
5
33
We also set
ti ≤ tj iff ti < tj or ti = tj .
Notes
1Well-known cases are the EPR (Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen 1935)
set-up and, more prominently, the GHZ (Greenberger, Horne, and Zeilinger
1989) set-up; cf. Bub (1997) for an overview.—It may be argued that due
to experimental uncertainties, the perfect (anti-)correlations presupposed in
these idealized set-ups can never be achieved, so that what is at issue is never
modal, but always probabilistic correlation. We hold that conclusion to be
premature. Certainly, for conceptual reasons one should understand modal
correlations first. Investigations into probabilistic BST-92 (Mu¨ller 2005)
underline this attitude: It seems that in order to do probability theory at
all, one has to presuppose that no modal correlations are present. If so, then
one had better understand the absence of what one is presupposing.
2Space-like correlations are the main feature of quantum-mechanical puz-
zles such as the famous EPR argument. Cf. note 1 for some references.
3More elaborate attempts, such as choosing C to be the full real line and
C the set of null sets, may give the right histories, but usually lead to a
failure of the prior choice principle.
4However, it is not the case that every case of PSLRMCFB is a case of
CFB with finite T—the sets may be infinite in PSLRMCFB too, only the
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setup is “intrinsically binary”.
5By transitivity of undividedness this is equivalent to H(ej) ⊆ Hi.
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